Stalin`s Rise
Stalin's rise to power was a combination of
his ability to manipulate situations
and the failure of others to prevent him
from taking power, especially Leon
Trotsky. Trotsky did not take
advantage of several opportunities which would
have helped him to crush
Stalin politically. When he failed to take advantage of
these opportunities,
Stalin maneuvered himself into a stronger position within
the party by
allying with Zinoviev and Kamenev. He manipulated them into
crushing Trotsky,
thus eliminating the strongest opponent in his path to power.
Stalin
deftly avoided potential political ruin when Lenin formulated
his
Testament in December 1922. Lenin's Testament described what he
thought of the
future of the Party and Party leaders, especially Trotsky and
Stalin. Lenin
warned of a potential split in which Stalin and Trotsky would
be the chief
factors. When describing Stalin, Lenin felt that he had
concentrated
"...unlimited authority... in his hands and whether he will
always be
capable of using that authority with sufficient caution." (Clark
472). The
content of Lenin's Testament eventually became more detrimental to
Trotsky than
Stalin. Coupled with the Lenin incidentally undermining
Trotsky, Stalin
manipulated the content of the Testament to enhance his
stature. By mentioning
Stalin as one of the prominent members of the
Party, Lenin raised Stalin's
stature to that of Trotsky. The equivalent
stature of Stalin and Trotsky made
Trotsky seem to be less important in
relation to Lenin and thus to the Party
apparatus. Further damaging Trotsky,
Lenin described him as possessing
"...excessive self-confidence... and overly
attracted by the purely
administrative aspects of affairs..." (Clark 472) The
latter
characterization of Trotsky was one that Stalin employed against him
throughout
their struggle for power. Lenin then added a postscript to the
Testament on
January 4, 1923, characterizing Stalin as a poor choice for
Secretary General by
stating, "...Stalin is too rude and this defect...
becomes intolerable in a
Secretary General." (Clark 474). Lenin continued
on to state that
"...the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from
that post and
appointing another man..." (Clark 474). Lenin felt that if the
removal of
Stalin was not acted upon, the conflict between Trotsky and
Stalin would
escalate, which would in turn endanger the party as a whole.
Combined with the
Testament, the Postscript could have served as a tool
for Trotsky to obtain
power, instead Stalin squashed it in the Central
Committee. Another possible
advantage left unused by Trotsky was Lenin's
disagreement with Stalin on how to
handle the Georgian Affair. During the war
with Poland, the Soviet republic
signed a treaty with the Menshevik
government of Georgia, "...which
solemnly undertook to respect Georgian
independence." (Segal 240). Lenin
wanted to maintain that Georgia remained a
"...sovereign and independent
unit which would have joined the Russian
federative state." (Clark 477). As
Commissar of Nationalities, Stalin
ordered the suppression of the Menshevik
party in Georgia. In order to
achieve his goal, Stalin was preparing a
constitution which was "...to be
much more centralistic... and would
curtail and abrogate the rights of the
non-Russian nationalities..." Also
in this new constitution, Stalin was going
to change "...Soviet Federation
of republics into the Soviet Union." (Pro 51)
Through a series of notes,
after the postscript, Lenin, with a guilty
conscience, admitted that he had not
sufficiently stopped the new oppression
of the weak by the strong and viewed the
centralistic nature of Stalin's
scheme as being "borrowed from Tsardom and
only just covered with a Soviet
veneer..." (Pro 71). He proceeded to
dictate notes on the Georgian Affair,
which were scathing criticisms of Stalin's
conduct. He described Stalin as a
"truly Russian man, the Great Russian
chauvinist, who is essentially... an
oppressor..." (Pro 71). Lenin
communicated to Trotsky that he desired him
"...take upon yourself the
defense of the Georgian affair at the Central
Committee..." (Clark 479) and
attached a copy of his notes on the subject.
Warning Trotsky not to show
weakness or uncertainty and not to accept any
compromises that Stalin might
offer. He stressed the need to avoid warning
Stalin and his associates of the
offensive. Stalin's antagonism towards
Trotsky was apparent. He criticized
Stalin's performance as Commissar of
Rabkrin by stating that "...it was
useless to look to Rabkrin for guidance if
the need arises for any change of
policy or for any serious reform in
organization..." (Pro 47). Zinoviev,
the most popular member of the
Politbureau, acted as Lenin's "...loud and
stormy mouthpiece... whos
knowledge about the world was unrefined and
unpolished... consequently...
leaving him devoured by ambition to rise higher in
the party..." (Pro 79).
Kamenev, though less popular, was more respected by
inner party leaders.
Armed with a more cultivated intellect and a steadier
character Kamenev was
attracted by moderate ideas and policies which set him up
as Zinoviev's
idealistic balance. Their traits complemented each other and thus
they
compromised and worked together well. The combination of these three
leaders
produced a majority against Trotsky in the Politbureau. Instead of
executing
Lenin's intentions, he proceeded to accept an undesirable
compromise.
Lenin intended on expelling Stalin from the party for at
least two years.
Trotsky stated that he "...was against removing
Stalin... but he agreed
with Lenin in substance..." (Pro90). He wanted Stalin
to apologize to
Krupskaya, behave more loyally to his colleagues, and
most importantly stop
pushing the Georgians around. Stalin accepted these
terms with great enthusiasm.
Eager to rectify his behavior, Stalin
prepared a written statement to the
general congress that denounced the Great
Russian Chauvinism that was being
exacted upon the Georgians. The most
serious of Lenin's strokes occurred after
this. The final stroke was
debilitated him, by paralyzing him, rendering him
speechless, and causing him
to suffer from sporadic spells of unconsciousness.
The generous terms of
Trotsky's compromise and Lenin's last stroke had multiple
effects upon his
ability to obtain party leadership and affected how Stalin
pursued his
leadership goals. Stalin's triumvirate successfully kept
Lenin's
Testament and Postscript inside of the Central Committee. Kamenev
objected by
stating that it should not be published "because it was not a
speech given
at the Politbureau." (Vol 243) Zinoviev thought that the
document should
only be distributed to the Central Committee. Stalin
suggested that there was no
reason to publish the document because Lenin did
not leave any instructions to.
Tomsky, Solts and Slavatinskaya, all
agreed with Zinoviev. The opposition to
publication was apparent and the
triumvirate succeeded in suppressing Lenin's
documents. Further action
against Trotsky was being undertaken by the
triumvirate. By using his
position as the General Secretary of the Party, Stalin
began to install
supporters of the ring in place of Trotsky supporters. Party
organizers were
employed on the criteria that they were against Trotsky.
Political
biographies were being reviewed and references to Trotsky were being
reduced
thus slowly eliminating him from important moments in history. The death
of
Lenin in January of 1924 allowed the triumvirate to begin to openly
attack
Trotsky. They labeled Trotsky a factionalist. He wrote two letter
that gave
Stalin and his allies enough ammunition to render Trotsky
politically powerless.
In the first letter Trotsky blamed the Scissors
Crisis on "...serious
errors of economic and political management... by the
leadership... which was an
effect of the extreme worsening of internal Party
conditions was due to the
process of bureaucratization that had overwhelmed
the Party..." The next
letter, named the ‘Trotskyist Manifesto,' stated that,
"...the Party
hierarchy, increasingly selects the memberships of conferences
and congress...
changing them into mere extensions of the hierarchy... and
the factionalism must
be stopped by those who instituted it... and a more
comradely unit must be
installed in order to achieve internal Party
democracy." (Vol 248). This
letter opened up the opportunity to accuse
Trotsky of reverting back to
Menshevism. The Thirteenth Party Congress
proceeded to condemn Trotsky and his
supporters' opinions as "...a Menshevik
revision of Bolshevism."
(Vol249) Labeling Trotsky as a factionalist enabled
Stalin to finally start to
point out how Trotsky was in disagreement with
Lenin and thus was an enemy to
the Party. Stalin took this power and
developed himself into the interpreter of
Leninism. Stalin worked on
eroding Trotsky's reputation that was built upon the
October revolution
and the civil war. He characterized Trotsky's roles in the
affairs to be over
inflated. Eventually, after constant political attack,
Trotsky was
informed that under article 58 of the criminal code, "...i.e.
the charge of
counter-revolutionary activity..."(Pro 391) he would be
deported to Alma Ata
in Turkestan. Expulsion was the last step in Trotsky's
failure to achieve
power. He was taken to Constantinople from where he
eventually emigrated to
Mexico. Stalin's ability to take advantage of Trotsky's
errors allowed him to
move on to crush the less significant former allies
Kamenev and Zinoviev.
After eliminating his political opponents Stalin would not
be opposed by
anyone until his death.